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Nishitani’s Nietzsche: Will to Power and the Moment 
Abstract: This paper reviews the current literature on the relationship of the Kyoto 
School philosopher Keiji Nishitani to Nietzsche’s writings. In particular, I respond to 
Bret Davis’ treatment of the relationship between the two thinkers in his 2011 article: 
‘Nishitani After Nietzsche: From the Death of God to the Great Death of the Will.’
1
 
Through recourse to Nishitani’s treatment of Nietzsche in The Self Overcoming of 
Nihilism as well as his later work Religion and Nothingness,2 I dispute the claim that 
Nishitani’s eventual dissatisfaction with Nietzsche’s philosophy is based on a 
negative assessment of will to power. I then go on to show that it is primarily on the 
issue of time more than that of will that Nishitani ultimately takes issue with 
Nietzsche’s mature philosophical standpoint. Finally, I outline a possible response to 
Nishitani’s criticisms from the perspective of Nietzsche’s thought.  
 
1. Bret Davis, “Nishitani After Nietzsche: From the Death of God to the Great Death of the Will.” In Japanese and Continental 
Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School, ed. Jason M. Wirth, Bret W. Davis, and Brian Schroeder (Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 2011), 82-101. 
2.Keiji Nishitani, The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, trans. Graham Parkes and Setsuko Aihara (New York: Suny Press, 1990) & 
Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Nishitani’s Nietzsche: Will to Power and the Moment 
 
 
     Nietzsche’s ‘death of God’ refers to a moment of profound upheaval within 
European culture. The death of God represents not only the demise of the Christian 
deity, but along with it the destruction of all absolute conceptions of reality, truth and 
the good: those metaphysical values that have sustained philosophy in the West since 
Plato. This destabilising event provides the focal point for Keiji Nishitani’s cross-
cultural examination of the problem of nihilism in the context of his critical 
engagement with Nietzsche’s writings.  
     Bret Davis, in his landmark study ‘Zen After Zarathustra: The Problem of the Will 
in the confrontation Between Nietzsche and Buddhism,’
1
 maps out the intricate 
relationship between Nietzsche’s thought and Buddhist philosophy. He undertakes 
this examination with reference to Nietzsche’s arguably ill-informed critique of 
Buddhism. Davis then offers an overview of the converse perspective on this 
dialogue, by examining the Buddhist critique of the will as a means to the overcoming 
of nihilism and by considering how this stands in critical relation to Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of will to power. The present paper will consider Davis’ subsequent 
discussion of the same issue in ‘Nishitani after Nietzsche: From the Death of God to 
the Great Death of the Will.’
2
 The decision to focus on the later paper is informed by 
its particular emphasis on the relationship between Nishitani and Nietzsche, offering a 
more appropriate foundation for close textual analysis of Nishitani’s reading of 
Nietzsche.
3
 
     Davis’ paper begins with a discussion of Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of 
God and its significance for the possibility of dialogue between Eastern and Western 
thought. Much Western philosophy after Nietzsche can be characterized by a self-
critical attitude, which is itself a reaction to the ‘crisis’ represented by the death of 
God: the crisis of nihilism or the undermining of all values hitherto known. As Davis 
asserts, the crisis of Western value-metaphysics entails not only the destabilization of 
the long-established foundations of Western thinking but also the emergence of a new 
possibility of dialogue with non-Western thought. The newfound intellectual humility 
arising from this moment permits Western philosophy to open itself up to dialogue 
with traditions of thought that had previously been characterized only in terms of their 
  
 
irreducible difference, and only in negative contrast to the presumed superiority of 
their Western alternatives. Davis recalls Heidegger’s various references to the future 
possibility of ‘planetary’ thinking and the inevitability of an ‘eventual dialogue with 
the East Asian world.’
4
 It is in this context that the work of the Kyoto School thinkers, 
including Keiji Nishitani, gains its distinctive status as one of the first significant 
attempts to engage in cross-cultural philosophy from a perspective ‘united beyond 
differences of east and west’.
5
  
     Nishitani was an avid reader of Nietzsche throughout his life, and his regard for 
the significance of Nietzsche’s contribution is vividly manifested in his writings. 
Davis interprets Nishitani’s attitude towards Nietzsche as sympathetic, but ultimately 
critical and, according to Davis, it is on the issue of the will and its role in the 
overcoming of nihilism that Nishitani sees himself (and the Zen tradition more 
generally) as parting ways with Nietzsche.  
     It cannot be denied that Nishitani does express certain misgivings concerning 
Nietzsche’s thought. Whereas his earlier treatment of Nietzsche in The Self-
Overcoming of Nihilism is almost entirely positive, his doubts begin to coalesce in his 
later work Religion and Nothingness. It seems likely that Nishitani’s contact with 
Heidegger during the first cycle of the latter's lectures on Nietzsche significantly 
influenced Nishitani's own approach to Nietzsche. Davis touches on the central 
difference between Heidegger’s and Nishitani’s interpretations by pointing out that, 
through his focus on the notion of amor fati, Nishitani is able to give ‘a more nuanced 
and sympathetic interpretation of the depth and reach of Nietzsche’s thought.’
6
 But 
despite this acknowledgement, and the sensitivity of his treatment of Nietzsche, 
Davis’ interpretation nevertheless seems to assume that Nishitani’s treatment of 
Nietzsche on the will is continuous with Heidegger’s insofar as it is the idea of will to 
power, as Nietzsche’s essential thought, that renders him unable to extricate himself 
from the dynamic of nihilism.
7
 The question then remains as to whether Nishitani is 
really as Heideggarian in his criticism of Nietzsche as Davis implies.   
     I do not want to suggest that Nishitani did not eventually see Nietzsche’s thought 
as divergent from his own. However, my misgivings with Davis’ account of the 
divide between the two thinkers stem from his emphasis on Nishitani’s criticism of 
Nietzsche’s understanding of the will. In the following sections I consider Davis’ 
account of the subtleties of Nishitani’s reception of Nietzsche—particularly the 
purported tension between Nishitani’s standpoint of absolute emptiness and 
  
 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of will to power. By drawing on Nishitani's earlier treatment 
of will to power in The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism as well as his later work Religion 
and Nothingness, I aim to illustrate how Nietzsche’s idea is better received by 
Nishitani than Davis’ interpretation suggests. I then go on to show that, while the 
issue of will remains a pivotal one, it is on the subject of time that Nishitani ultimately 
takes issue with Nietzsche’s mature philosophical standpoint.
8
  
 
Nietzsche’s Nihilism and the ‘Will Critique’ 
 
     According to Nietzsche, nihilism does not begin in modernity but is already tacitly 
present throughout the history of the Christian tradition. One could go so far as to say 
that, for Nietzsche, nihilism is the defining value implication of Christian 
metaphysics, in which nihilism is expressed—either implicitly or explicitly—through 
the denial of the value of life and of the immediate world. The Christian metaphysical 
worldview presupposes transcendent, world-renouncing values in place of values by 
which one might affirm life in this world. It places all power and value in the world 
beyond, through the assertion of the omnipotence of the will of God above, over and 
outside of the immediate world. As Nietzsche succinctly puts it in Ecce Homo: 
The concept ‘hereafter’, ‘true world’ invented in order to devalue the 
only world there is—so as to leave no goal, no reason, no task for our 
earthly reality! (‘Destiny’, 8)
9
 
 
 In its preferring to will toward this ‘true world’ (a fabricated nothingness) than not to 
will at all, Christianity denies the natural reality of will to power whilst covertly 
reasserting its own will to power in sublimated form.  
     In the next stage of the history of nihilism, modern nihilism reveals the sublimated 
will of religion in its turn to atheism. Yet by failing to replace God with a suitable 
metaphysical alternative, the modern will forgets to will even nothingness, and 
thereby the radical danger of a life that can no longer posit metaphysical value for 
itself comes to the fore. In this modern pessimistic nihilism, which neglects to take up 
an active and affirmative evaluation of life, will to power appears in its weakest and 
sickliest form.  
     Nietzsche’s mature philosophy may be interpreted as an attempt to resolve this 
problem through the idea of will to power, conceived as the fundamental principle of 
life and even the world itself, whereby the world can be understood in its intelligible 
  
 
aspect as ‘“will to power” and nothing else’ (BGE 36).10 For Nietzsche, by relocating 
(or rediscovering) our foundational constitution in will to power, we thereby uncover 
the world-affirming creative impulses that have been operating covertly for millennia. 
He thereby hopes to open up the possibility of creating new values in a world beyond 
the nihilistic values of Judeo-Christian metaphysics.  In his boldest estimations, the 
idea of will to power as a new means of evaluation is intended to herald the true 
overcoming of nihilism through the possibility of value-creation in a world beyond 
good and evil.  
     But according to Davis, by focusing on the idea of will to power Nietzsche 
endorses a reactive affirmation of the will of the subject. This subjectivized 
interpretation of existence is personified in Nietzsche’s figure of the Übermensch, 
who aggressively asserts his will in the formation of new evaluations. Nietzsche thus 
embraces ‘an active nihilism that would prepare for the overman as a figure of 
maximal will to power’.
11
 The problem however, Davis argues, in line with 
Heidegger’s Nietzsche critique, is that this assertion is only a further entanglement in 
the logic of nihilism. By reifying the subject-perspective, and through the reactive 
formulation of wilfulness in the idea of will to power, Nietzsche unwittingly becomes 
the ultimate propagator of nihilism. Nietzsche’s answer to the problem of the will in 
nihilism is simply to relocate what was once the will of God to the perspective of the 
will of the human being. The idea of will to power is therefore conceived merely as 
the positing of human will over the world, and as humanity’s misguided attempt to 
establish its position at the centre of existence through the reification of will to power 
itself. According to this line of reasoning, Nietzsche fails to come to terms with the 
essence of the problem that nihilism presents us with, which, once again framed from 
a Heideggerian perspective, is understood to be constituted precisely by the striving of 
the will itself. To put this in Buddhist terms, the problem of nihilism is equated with 
the problem of karmic existence.  
     By having misconstrued the elemental source of nihilism, that is, the will itself, 
Nietzsche fails to achieve a perspective of radical non-willing akin to that of 
Heidegger or Nishitani’s Zen-inspired philosophy. Nietzsche’s vision of reality 
therefore affirms a continued attachment to the infinite striving to expand the ego that 
is understood to be the very source of nihilism. On this basis, Davis concludes that ‘in 
the end, Nietzsche’s reaffirmation is found to remain limited insofar as residues of 
heteronomy as well as of egocentricity inevitably remain in a philosophy of will to 
  
 
power.’
12
 
     However, as Graham Parkes has previously stated, there is a strong case for 
disputing Davis’ assertion that Nietzsche’s idea of will to power is subject- or ego-
centred.
13
 Parkes points to the importance of distinguishing between the ‘small-self’ 
or ego-hypothesis on the one hand (which Nietzsche criticizes as a mere 
construction), and the superseding idea of the ‘great-self’ on the other. He thereby 
situates Nietzsche more closely to the non-anthropocentric conception of subjectivity 
found in Zen Buddhism (and indeed in Nishitani’s own philosophy).
 
On this basis, 
Parkes suggests that the criticisms of Nietzsche’s will to power offered by both Davis 
and Nishitani result from a lack of attention to the overcoming of the ego-perspective 
as it appears in Nietzsche’s writings.
14
 
     In order to justify my further defence of Nietzsche against Davis’ will-critique I 
now take a rather different direction by referring back to Nishitani’s treatment of 
Nietzsche in The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism. 
     Nishitani’s earlier reading expressly denies the claim that Nietzsche’s will to 
power is a wilful reaction against nihilism. Instead, Nishitani focuses on the idea that 
will to power, in Nietzsche’s most refined formulation, constitutes precisely the 
position beyond ‘the very duality of will and will-lessness’ that Davis denies him.
15
 
This is clearly evident in the text itself:  
Thus the world of eternal recurrence is a phenomenon of will. As 
Nietzsche says in the final lines of The Will to Power: “This world is 
will to power and nothing besides! And you also are this will to power 
– and nothing besides!” [WP 1067]. At this point not only knowledge 
as such but even the concept of will itself becomes useless, insofar as 
will is nothing more than a striving against things that resist it. But in 
the standpoint of the eternal recurrence both the resistances and the 
striving against them have been overcome. As Nietzsche says, the 
world is “divine play” (göttliches Spiel). This does not mean that 
whatever resists or expends effort simply disappears; if it did, there 
would be no “play.” It is rather a standpoint where resistance is 
resistance and yet becomes non-resistance, where striving is striving 
and yet becomes not-striving.
16
 
 
 Nishitani further underscores this point by referring to Nietzsche’s own idea of ‘the 
elimination of will’ as a requisite for the true consummation of fatalism (or 
nihilism)—that is, for its self-overcoming. He quotes from Nietzsche’s posthumously 
published note to that effect: 
My consummation of fatalism:  
1. Through eternal recurrence and pre-existence 
  
 
2. Through the elimination of the concept of will
17
 
(Nietzsche, KGW, VII, 2:25, 214, 66) 
 
 In Nishitani’s reading, Nietzsche’s ‘elimination of the concept of will’ must be 
understood as a transformation of what the word ‘will’ designates on the cosmic level 
of life conceived as will to power. Otherwise, this elimination of will, in order to face 
the abyssal thought of thoroughgoing fatality, would become a denial of will to power 
rather than its ultimate formulation.   
     The point, for Nishitani, is that the ‘bird’s-eye view’ from which the self comes to 
encompass all that is not the self through amor fati—learning to love the self as a 
piece of fate—transcends the understanding of will as a striving against opposing 
forces (WP 1004).  At its furthest reaches, the soul becomes the summation of these 
opposing forces, taking on the perspective of will to power or of the world itself.  But 
as Nishitani rightly notes, from this most extreme perspective ‘even the concept of 
will itself becomes useless, insofar as will is nothing more than a striving against 
things which resist it’.
18
 Therefore the will of all that is, considered as a totality, as 
will to power, is not a will at all.  But this is not to eliminate the infinite 
differentiation of the will to power and the manifold resistances of which it is entirely 
composed. Rather, the perspective of the whole does not negate multiplicity, but is in 
fact constituted by it. This explains Nishitani’s employment of the Zen logic of 
contradictory identity here in order to describe Nietzsche’s ultimate intentions for the 
concept of will where ‘striving is striving and yet becomes not striving’ and ‘will in 
the ordinary sense is overcome’.
19
 
     The formulation of the world as will to power as an explicit middle way between 
will and will-lessness suggests that, through the perspective of amor fati, Nietzsche 
has already achieved a harmony of active and passive voice, of will and will-lessness.   
    However, Davis’ account of Nishitani’s reception of Nietzsche would still ring true, 
if Nishitani came to replace his earlier sympathetic treatment of Nietzsche’s will to 
power with a more critical position in Religion and Nothingness. However, there 
Nishitani’s move toward criticism of Nietzsche is not primarily a transition in his 
understanding of will to power, but instead expresses his misgivings over the way 
Nietzsche depicts time as never-ending sameness in his notion of eternal recurrence—
a point which I will return to later. 
     Nishitani does indeed refer to will to power critically in Religion and Nothingness, 
but the ways in which he addresses it here can appear frustratingly under-elaborated, 
  
 
if not contradictory. Both Parkes and Davis refer to one of the most detailed 
discussions of the will to power in the text, where Nishitani writes: 
Insofar as what is here at issue is a “will,” that is, something conceived 
of in the third person as an “it,” it has yet to rid itself of the character 
of a “being.”
20
  
 
 In relation to this passage, Davis rightly asserts, contra Parkes, that the problem for 
Nishitani here is not merely that Nietzsche casts will to power as a ‘being;’ but 
instead, that will to power is articulated in the third person means that it is conceived 
heterogeneously and therefore as something fundamentally separate from the self, 
where ‘it does not lose its connotation of being an other for us’.21 However, Davis’ 
recognition of this seems incongruous with his subsequent formulation of Nishitani’s 
criticism of will to power in terms of its excessive emphasis on the subject-
perspective. Nishitani’s claim here is that the field of will to power is still conceived 
too much as a ‘transhistorical’ plane, rather than in its immediate existential 
significance within the self and within time.
22
  
     For Nishitani, even in those places where Nietzsche goes so far as to identify the 
self with the will, he cannot yet make the further and more radical claim that the will 
is in fact also only the self. The problem then for Nishitani is not that the concept of 
the will to power places too much emphasis on the subject, but rather that it is not 
subjectivized enough. Its implications on the existential level have not been 
incorporated to the extent that it can be encountered from a position beneath the split 
between subject and object or, in other words, on the field of emptiness. Until will to 
power is comprehended from the perspective of that common source of both self and 
world, it will be conceived in the third person as an “it”: a “being” with substantial 
independence from our own. Nishitani suggests that this is precisely what marks the 
fundamental distinction between Nietzsche and Zen: 
Although from Nietzsche’s stance, we can say that our self is, in fact, 
“that,” [will to power] we cannot yet say that “that” in itself is, in fact, 
our self. In other words although one can speak of a “self that is not a 
self,” one cannot yet speak of a “self that is not self’.’
23
 
 
     In response to Nishitani, one might follow Parkes and point to the explicit 
transition between the negative pole of the negated small-self or ego in Nietzsche and 
the active pole of a great-self that has negated even that negation.  
     Further, we might consider Nietzsche’s own suggestion that the commanding 
influence of will to power exceeds even those who command, who, he claims, must 
  
 
go so far as to ‘risk [life] for the sake of power’(Z II.12). Whereas Davis depicts this 
thought as a reason to conclude that Nietzsche’s will to power resists incorporation, 
we might well conclude the very opposite insofar as Nietzsche’s claim can be taken to 
suggest that will to power, as the secret of life itself, cannot be understood merely in 
terms of the self-will of any individual. This is not to say that will to power is 
fundamentally other than the self, a being that the self stands in relation to, but that it 
in fact operates at a deeper level of our constitution than any individual instance of its 
enactment can fully express. The will commands the self, and not vice versa, even if 
self-willing is that process through which, on occasion, the will to power expresses 
itself.  
     During the same discussion of will to power in Religion and Nothingness, 
Nishitani underscores the more pressing criticisms of Nietzsche in the text as a whole. 
There is, for instance, Nishitani’s aforementioned suggestion that will to power is 
conceived as a being ‘on a transhistorical plane,’ along with his subsequent account of 
what a plane of existence fully reverted back into the self would amount to. 
If it had been completely so reverted back into the self, we should not 
find so much as a single strand capable of representation as a “being” 
left …Then the original countenance of time would be unveiled in time 
originating as truly bottomless time; and the original countenance of 
history would be unveiled in the complete and radical discharging of 
its historicity.
24
  
 
     These later claims are complex ones that are central to the overarching project of 
Religion and Nothingness as a whole. But this summary intimates that it is most 
fundamentally on the topics of time and history that Nishitani’s criticism of Nietzsche 
comes to rest. At one point Nishitani suggests that it is only insofar as it is formulated 
in relation to eternal recurrence that the idea of will to power is lacking. He claims: 
Insofar as the Will to Power comes down in the final analysis to a 
world view of Eternal Recurrence, it is my view that the meaning it 
gives to history as its last and final ground, on the field of ecstatic 
transcendence, is based only on a negative pole.
25
  
 
     Nishitani’s criticisms of the eternal recurrence are intricate. But, in simple terms, 
his problem with Nietzsche’s temporal model is that through the idea of sameness in 
recurrence Nietzsche disallows an account of lived time as the experience of 
perpetually new moments. The distinction that Nishitani thereby makes, between 
Nietzsche’s understanding of time and his own, is between repetition, which he takes 
to exclude the possibility of genuine novelty, and an eternal process of differentiation 
  
 
or what Nishitani calls ‘truly bottomless time’.
26
  
     Along the same lines Nishitani disputes the assumption that the Zen-Buddhist 
conception of time is cyclical. His point regarding Nietzsche is that the cyclical nature 
of eternal recurrence indicates a conception of time in which humans cannot escape 
their karmic existence by coming to fully comprehend the temporal as one and the 
same as the eternal, in Nishitani’s terms, as ‘samsāra-sive-nirvāna’.27 In contrast, 
samsāra-sive-nirvāna describes the essence of lived-time in its existential actuality, as 
the incomparable and therefore unrepeatable moment. Nishitani puts it like this:  
If the Will to Power […] only opens up a field of the Eternal 
Recurrence of the same world-time, then history is ultimately merely 
restored in such a fashion that it cannot discharge its true historicity.
28
  
 
The subsequent sentence then summarizes Nishitani’s main concern here:   
So long as the view that something absolutely new is being created in 
time cannot radically be carried through, history is always deprived of 
its true meaning.
29
  
 
 As if this were not already clear, he repeats the same point once again in later 
discussion: 
I have to repeat what was said before: Nietzsche’s standpoint of 
Eternal Recurrence and the Will to Power was not able to fully realize 
the meaning of the historicity of historical things.
30
  
 
 In this last passage Nishitani elaborates on his previous reference to the problem that 
the will to power is conceived as separate from the self. The ‘historicity of historical 
things’, for Nishitani, is always connected to the immediate existential content of our 
direct experience within time. His criticism seems to be that in being conceived as an 
other, will to power cannot be the subject of our direct experience of ourselves or our 
own self-awareness from the perspective of a lived history: one that is understood 
through the lens of genuine momentariness. That is to say that it cannot be the subject 
of an experience of a moment that can never recur: 
So long as it is regarded as an entity named will, it does not completely 
lose its connotation of being an other for us and thus cannot become 
something wherein we can truly become aware of ourselves at our 
elemental source.
31
  
 
 He further states:  
Eternal Recurrence does not make time to be truly time. Nietzsche, too, 
speaks of the "moment" as the twinkling of an eye (Augenblick), but it 
  
 
is a moment standing against a background of Eternal Recurrence and 
hence does not possess the bottomlessness of the true moment.
32
  
 
Nietzsche, Nishitani and the Moment 
 
     One of Nishitani's key contributions in Religion and Nothingness is his 
presentation of the benefits of a Zen-inspired focus on the emptiness of the immediate 
moment as a foundation for understanding time in general and, in fact, the world and 
ourselves as such. For Nishitani, temporality is equated with genuine and 
thoroughgoing transience, where what it is to be in time is precisely to be coming to 
be and always to be already passing away. The true nature of the moment does not 
reside in its persistence or substance but in its perishing or emptiness. For Nishitani, 
the Zen thinker Dōgen provides the inspiration for reformulating our understanding of 
reality on the basis of a moment-focused conception of time. To quote from Dōgen’s 
Uji:  
Since there is nothing but just this moment, the time-being is all the 
time there is. Grassbeing, form-being are both time. Each moment is 
all being, is the entire world. Reflect now whether any being or any 
world is left out of the present moment.
33
 
 
     Nishitani argues—perhaps unfairly—that even Nietzsche’s thought is incapable of 
freeing itself from bondage to a traditional Western conception of time wherein the 
moment, because of its transient nature, is relegated to the status of something that 
never attains full reality. He therefore sees the Zen tradition as offering fresh insights 
into the problem of nihilism, where lived-time—the moment itself—can be 
understood to be radically empty and at the same time completely real.  
     Nishitani’s further charge against the eternal recurrence is that it represents a 
mythological as opposed to an actual understanding of the nature of time as lived 
experience. In opposition to this conception, he presents the understanding of time in 
Zen with reference to Hakuin’s commentaries on the Heart-Sutra: 
Before all the kalpas [world-times] past and after all the kalpas to 
come. 
A marvellous spiritual light glints with austere chill in the sheath of a 
hair-splitting blade. 
A round gem, shining in dark night, is brought forth on its tray. 
34
 
 
Hakuin’s comments allude to an understanding of the inner essence of momentariness 
as a perspective that resists or even transcends the reality of the sublimely large 
  
 
measures of time as given in the idea of repeating kalpas. Nevertheless, Nishitani 
insists that this way of understanding time, with reference to the bottomless moment, 
is closer to the presented reality of moments as we actually experience them. 
Nishitani’s comment on Hakuin then provides further illumination: 
Hakuin's words are enough to give us a glimpse of how radically actual 
time is in Buddhism and on what standpoint so radically realistic a 
view of time is able to come about … it is on the standpoint of sunyata 
[emptiness] that historicity is able to realize itself radically.
35
 
 
  In order to reply to Nishitani’s critique of the eternal recurrence it will be necessary 
to establish a more elaborate account of Nietzsche’s idea in relation to Nishitani’s 
understanding of temporality, and to ascertain whether Nishitani’s criticism does 
justice to Nietzsche’s formulation. This in turn demands an explanation of what 
precisely is intended by the idea of sameness in recurrence as Nietzsche understood it, 
and whether eternal recurrence does in fact allow for a depiction of time (or 
specifically, the nature of momentariness) in affinity with Nishitani’s own. 
     If particular configurations of entities is what Nietzsche sees as recurring eternally 
within the context of indefinite time, then Nishitani’s criticisms may be on the mark. 
Nietzsche’s suggestions that it is things and our encounters with them that will recur 
in their selfsame configurations might also be taken as evidence for this. However, if 
what remains the same in recurrence is the moment itself, then Nietzsche is much 
closer to Nishitani’s position, and to that of Zen more generally, than Nishitani gives 
him credit for. Justification for this interpretation lies in the fact that Zarathustra’s 
encounter with the thought of eternal recurrence in ‘On the Vision and Riddle’ takes 
place from the perspective of the gateway of the moment. The gateway of the moment 
is presented by Nietzsche as being the position from which the necessity of eternal 
recurrence can be apprehended: ‘From this gateway Moment a long eternal lane runs 
backward: behind us lies an eternity... Must not whatever among all things can walk 
have walked this lane already?’ (Z III.2) 
     Further, if every moment is for Nietzsche truly distinct from every other, then the 
temporality of the moment is ecstatically self-alienating—that is, the moment is 
always different from that which it is likened to: other moments. This conception, 
being congruent with Nishitani’s own, involves an approach to time in which the 
nature of temporality resides in its own utter transience—not the transience of time 
conceived as a whole, but of the moment itself. The temporality of momentariness is 
  
 
thereby understood to reside in its very passing away, in its actual and ineradicable 
finitude. It is not surprising then that for Zarathustra the encounter with the thought of 
eternal recurrence from the standpoint of the moment is represented through the 
empty structure of the gateway, which is, moreover, a structure that is given its 
function by means of a transient activity—that is, our passing through it. Thus, the 
gateway provides an image which represents two types of essentially non-substantial 
activity, both that of the moment itself and the coming-to-be of that which passes 
through it: ourselves. We can say on the basis of this that the moment is both eternally 
present as the structure of our temporal pathway and, with regards to any substantial 
content, that it is also perpetually empty. This suggests that, for Nietzsche, the ever-
present moment is both eternally recurrent and yet perpetually irreducible to all other 
moments past and future.  
     The presence of the gateway of the moment on Zarathustra’s path also announces a 
clear connection between this passage and Nietzsche’s other insights into the 
possibility of affirming the whole with reference to the moment. Interestingly, in 
relation to Zen, it is Nietzsche’s understanding of the interdependence of all things 
that allows for an eternal affirmation to take place within time, where all things ‘are 
knotted together so tightly that this moment draws after it all that is to come’ (Z 
III.2).
36
 It is this interconnectedness of things that explains the affirmation of the 
eternal from the perspective of the momentary when Zarathustra says:  
––if you ever wanted one time a second time, if you ever said ‘You 
please me, happiness! Quick! Moment!’ then you wanted it all back! 
––All anew, all eternally, all chained together, entwined, in love, oh 
then you loved the world—(Z IV.19, §10) 
 
In the Nachlass, Nietzsche reiterates Zarathustra’s words with the claim that ‘If we 
affirm one single moment, we thus affirm not only ourselves but all existence’ (WP 
1067).  
 
     We have seen from Nishitani’s The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, that he offers a 
more sympathetic interpretation of will to power than the will-critique supposes, and 
further that his problem with understanding will to power as a being is that such a 
conception is not sufficiently subjectivized, and therefore not comprehended in its 
immediate existential relation to the self at its most elemental level.  
  
 
     From what has been said, it seems that the discussion of Nishitani’s relationship to 
Nietzsche is better served through an analysis of the questions Nishitani raises 
regarding temporality rather than through a primary focus on the issue of the will, 
even though the latter remains a pivotal issue for the ongoing discussion of 
Nietzsche’s relationship to Buddhism. With regard to the general framework for 
considering Nietzsche in relation to the Buddhist position, and specifically to 
Mahayana, Davis’ work constitutes the most significant assessment to date. However, 
the truly distinctive aspect of Nishitani’s contribution to world philosophy may be 
seen to lie in his creative reappraisal of the understanding of time in Zen Buddhism. 
Nishitani’s re-evaluation is undertaken from a perspective that is also profoundly 
sensitive to the historically and temporally oriented context of the post-Kantian 
Continental tradition. Therefore the shift in focus that I have advocated in this paper 
would have the benefit of placing the debate between the two thinkers in much closer 
proximity to the central project of Nishitani’s Religion and Nothingness, and would 
also demonstrate the largely unappreciated importance of Nishitani’s philosophy from 
the perspective of European thought. 
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